Contractual legal relations between regions of North Caucasia and the federal centre

The procedure of agreement execution is well elaborated at the federal and regional levels. In Russia the contractual practice of relations between the centre and the subjects of the Federation is used almost in half of the regions (more than 40 of 89). In North Caucasia the contracts on distribution of authorities and objects of possession are signed with four subjects from ten: with Kabardino-Balkariya, North Ossetia, Krasnodar Territory and Rostov Region.

The fact that the contracts do not encompass all North Caucasian subjects of the Russian Federation is explained by the tendency of each of them to create direct relations with the federal authorities independently, using lobbing abilities of the management for obtaining certain privileges and advantages. In 1999 the agreements on distribution of authorities were signed with two republics - Kabardino-Balkariya (July, 1994) and North Ossetia-Alania (March, 1995). The agreement with Krasnodar Territory (January, 1996) was one of the first experiences of bilateral contract with a "Russian" region from the new borderline of Russia. The agreement with Rostov Region was signed during the presidential election campaign in June 1996.

From the legal point of view bilateral contracts are concluded between the federal and regional governments in addition to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and republican Constitutions and in many respects have clarification meaning. They provide clarified interpretation of authorities and responsibilities of the parties, that is why they are called agreements on distribution of authorities and objects of possession. The practice demonstrates that the definition of spheres of competence of the parties is the most difficult issue. In the agreements with the federal centre the competence of the republics (within the limits of republican Constitutions) is usually expanded due to "objects of joint possession" - in particular possession, use and disposal of land, mineral and other natural resources, production facilities.

A more precise definition of "objects of possession" and "authorities" of the centre and the regions is provided in special agreements signed together with the main agreements. Main of these agreements usually belong to the sphere of economy and foreign economic issues and to social sphere, culture, education, science, etc.

5 agreements determining authorities and competence of the parties were signed in addition to bilateral agreement with North Ossetia-Alania (March, 1995):

 * on property;
* on defence industry;
* on sanatorium treatment, recreation and tourism;
* on possession, use and disposal of land and other natural resources;
* on foreign economic relations.

9 agreements were signed in addition to agreement with Krasnodar Territory (January, 1996):

* on secondary, higher and postgraduate vocational education;
* on agriculture;
* on construction, architecture, town planning and public utilities;
* on interbudget relations;
* on law enforcement and social security;
* on distribution of state property;
* on sanatorium treatment, recreation and tourism;
* on organisation and implementation of customs services;
* on economic issues.

18 agreements were signed in addition to agreement with Rostov Region (June, 1996):

* on currency and credit policy;
* on organisation of customs services;
* on interbudget relations;
* on possession, use and disposal of natural resources;
* on law enforcement and social security;
* on possession, use and disposal of natural resources and environment protection;
* on maintenance of industrial stability;
* on science and education;
* on regulation of migratory processes;
* on control of state property;
* on possession, use and disposal of land;
* on public health services;
* on transport and communications;
* on maintenance and development of fuel and energy complex;
* on agriculture;
* on construction, architecture, town planning and public utilities;
* on prevention and liquidation of natural and technogenic emergency situations;
* on mobilisation of economy and civil defence.

Kabardino-Balkariya did not sign additional agreements to the agreement with the federal centre. At the same time it has received certain privileges and advantage in the sphere of economy through the relevant Governmental orders and Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation.

The economic agreements of North Caucasian subjects with the federal authorities basically have justified themselves since they have differentiated competences of executive authorities in the economic sphere and, consequently, have facilitated the process of control over the economy of the regions.

Contractual legal relations with Chechen Republic should be considered separately.

Chechnya stands aside in the system of relations between the Centre and the subjects of the Russian Federation. In 1991 it unilaterally proclaimed independence (Nokhchi-Cho) and did not sign the federative agreement in 1992. That was a challenge to the territorial unity of Russia and a precedent of "not entering" into the structure of the Russian Federation. Not having received acknowledgement of the world community as a subject of international law and not having realised in practice the principle of separation from Russia, Chechnya continued to share the economic space with the Russian Federation. It is possible to admit only the fact of partial separation of the republic from the legal space of Russia and supremacy of its own laws in its territory.

The position of the Russian authorities in relation to Chechnya and personally its leader D. Dudayev in 1991 -1993 was not consistent and underwent noticeable changes: from non-recognition and blockade to ignoring of the existing situation (Chechnya is "outside of Russia"). The attempts of bilateral negotiations about the future status of Chechnya in January 1993 ended in a fiasco (the agreement for distribution of authorities between the Russian Federation and Chechen Republic was discussed).

In 1994 Moscow began to apply hard policy in relation to Dudayev government, having counted on "healthy forces of Chechen society" and actually having backed up anti-Dudayev opposition that called for "restoration of constitutional order in the republic". In December 1994 Russian troops entered Chechnya and gradually occupied a large part of it`s territory. The power in Grozny was changed for forces loyal to Moscow. In December 1995 with the government of D. Zavgayev an agreement on the main principles of relationships was concluded, which was supposed to anticipate the full scale agreement between Russia and Chechnya. It was planned to be concludes after the adoption of the new Constitution of Chechen Republic. This bilateral agreement has not defined the status of Chechnya and only has indicated the necessity of admission of its special status with allowance for historical and other traditions.

In the meantime armed opposition in the territory of Chechnya did not cease, and from the middle of 1996 began a new escalation of confrontation followed by the seizure of Grozny by Chechen troops.

On August 30, 1996 in Khasavyurt (Dagestan) the representatives of the federal authority (A. Lebed) and Chechen Republic (A. Maskhadov) signed two documents: Declaration and Principle of determination of the fundamentals of relationships between the Russian Federation and Chechen Republic. These documents put an end to the war. Thus, the solution of the issue of the status of Chechnya was postponed till December 2001, i.e. a sort of transition period was established. At the same time none of provisions of the agreements signed in Khasavyurt did not interpret the status of Chechen Republic as a sovereign state.

On May 12, 1997 in Moscow B. Yeltsin and A. Maskhadov signed an Agreement on peace and principles of relationships between the Russian Federation and Chechen Republic Ichkeria. Except for this agreement two more agreements were signed: on economic co-operation and on organisation of circulation of money and clearing settlement. The signing of these documents in essence meant unified economic and financial space of the Russian Federation and Chechen Republic, at the same time the present status Chechnya was not changed and it was not recognised as a subject of international law. Later on 43 Russian ministries and agencies signed agreements with the relevant offices of Chechen Republic (11 agreements only on oil production industry). On July 12, 1997 a Russian-Chechen customs agreement was signed, on September 9 - the agreement on transit of early Caspian oil.

At the same time in respect of solution of political problems the positions of Moscow and Grozny were very different. Chechnya still declared itself as an independent state creating relations with the Russian Federation on the basis of international rule. The authorities of Grozny rejected any versions of agreements with Moscow that in their judgement could differently interpret the tendency of the republic to full political independence. So, the proposal of "self-governed republic in the territory of Russia" and "possibilities of association" of Chechen Republic with the Russian Federation was rejected. The Chechen leaders repeatedly offered Moscow to establish diplomatic relations as between two sovereign states and agreed to sign simultaneously with the "international agreement" agreements on common economic and defence space.

The draft agreement on distribution of objects of possession and authorities prepared the federal centre in 1997 envisaged broad powers of the republic, even exceeding the rights on "Tatarstan version". It stipulated the right to have the Constitution, legislation and all entirety of the state powers. The Chechen authorities would control such important issues as organisation government authorities, administrative division, territory and status of the republic, ownership of land, natural resources, etc.

In the reply the Chechen authorities have prepared their draft agreement on good neighbourhood and co-operation which was not considered by Moscow. Thus, the negotiations between Moscow and Grozny during the following two years reached a deadlock and after the attack of Chechen bandits on Dagestan in 1999 and the beginnings of antiterrorist campaign in Chechnya by the federal centre the Russian authorities again started a hard line policy in respect of Grozny and declared that Khasavyurt agreements were exhausted tactically and strategically.