Report on The Ways to Peace in the North Caucasus: Conclusions and Recommendations

Assessment of the Situation and of the Nature of Conflicts
On the General Principles and Doctrine of Statehood
The Economy and Social Life
The Political Process and Governance
Politics under Conditions of Conflict
Armed Separatism and Terrorism
The Religious Factor in Conflicts
The Cultural Space and the Russian Factor
Science, Conflict Mythology, and Peacemaking
Foreign Policy Aspects and Activities

Assessment of the Situation and of the Nature of Conflicts

The North Caucasus is the most complex region from the standpoint of the socioeconomic situation, state administration, and the ensuring of Russian national security. This region has seen armed conflicts, one of which - the war in Chechnya - has become the most destructive on the territory of the former USSR. It is here that there is a real threat to the national security of the Russian Federation, its integrity, and its sovereignty. It is here that we have seen the phenomenon of the mass exit of part of the population from the legal order and the emergence of separatist region outside the control of the Russian authorities. It is here the radical ethnic nationalism and religious extremism have taken on violent forms, presenting a challenge not only to the government, but also to the foundations of society and of the local population.

Current Russian policy in the North Caucasus has made the most tragic errors, resulting in huge numbers of victims and massive destruction, for which the Russian authorities bear responsibility. Another notable factor in the case of the North Caucasus today is the failure of the decision-making process and of the social science expertise. The scientific-intellectual community, including the intelligentsia of Moscow and the North Caucasus, bears a share of the responsibility for the inability to explain the situation and to have a peacemaking effect on society. It is time for Russian politicians and public activists at various levels to realize that the time for arbitrary improvisations and elitist prescriptions has passed. Such actions cannot serve as the basis for effective state governance. It is essential to build a system for considering and making political-governmental decisions on the basis of professional expertise. Such a system must not only feature the use expertise from within the government, but also must include independent domestic monitoring of ethno-political and other problems in the North Caucasus.

The problems in the North Caucasus are so serious that they demand the mobilization of substantial resources from the entire country, responsible expert planning and consideration, consistent political and other necessary actions on the part of the government, and the consolidation of societal efforts aimed at ensuring peace in the region. The clear and unambiguous articulation of the goals and objectives of government policy in the North Caucasus is a necessary condition to ensure that this policy is carefully weighed and balanced. The main goals of this policy should be:

1. ensuring territorial integrity and security;
2. achieving social prosperity for the population;
3. ensuring civil equality;
4. providing for democratic governance;
5. maintaining and developing cultural diversity;
6. preventing and resolving conflicts.

The North Caucasus is a region with a complex social and cultural mosaic. Living here in a compact space are representatives of over 40 ethnic communities of the Russian people, who have longstanding historical ties with the rest of Russia and who maintain their own cultural distinctiveness. Ethnic and historical factors are not the main reason for the problems and conflicts in the region, just as the central federal government does not bear sole responsibility for the current situation in the region. A significant part of the responsibility lies with the local politicians, the ethnic leaders, and with the common citizens who are violating the law and the norms of social morality. The conflicts in the region are of a complex character and have internal and external causes, but there is not one that was not programmed by history or by human nature. There is not one single scenario for resolving conflicts in the region, but there can be common principles.

Under the influence of political rhetoric, outside propaganda, and a number of real circumstances, a psychological complex of past humiliation and current discontent has formed among some in the North Caucasus in the past decade. This in turn has led to the weakening of loyalty to Russia as a whole. For part of the population, the striving toward integration and higher-status positions within the wider national space turned out to be weaker than the reliance on the radical option of full sovereignty on an ethnic basis. It is this conflict-generating political project that was taken up in arms by partisans of ethnic nationalism.

In the course of the conflicts there have been massive killings, property seizures, and forced relocations of people driven from their places of residence. Violent relocations of people as a result of policies of discrimination and conflicts are not only a consequence of the conflicts, but also a reason for ongoing tensions, sporadic violence, and new conflict in the future. All measures must be taken, especially by the state, to prevent the forced relocation of people, to punish those who initiated and carried out such actions, and to return people to their previous places of residence as soon as possible.

It is unfounded to believe that intentional relocations of people, including the departure of ethnic Russians from the republics, the drive for ethnically homogeneous territories in the North Caucasus, and for the "repatriation of fellow countrymen" are legitimate for political or moral-historical reasons. The creation of ethnic enclaves or the purposeful endorcement of a demographic majority for one group is no less likely to give rise to tension and conflict than are ethnically mixed territories or communities of various ethnicities living in peace at the grass root level. Nevertheless, existing ethnic homogeneity of local communities as well as the ethnic complexities of the population of cities and villages should be preserved if possible. Conflicts are caused not so much by the fact that a population is multiethnic, but because its habitual proportions are too sharply changed.

One important cause of violence and conflict is the loss of state control over weapons and army arsenals. This allowed poorly equipped and insufficiently trained leaders and activists, under the influence of ideologues of nationalism and religious extremism, to effect a mass exit from the sphere of legality and to challenge the state and social order. Violent conflict is most often the sum of individual criminal acts and not the manifestation of some collective will or historical law. It is from this standpoint that measures for conflict resolution should primarily be viewed, that is, from the legal perspective.

Not only socioeconomic factors, but also ideological factors play a large role in the conflicts in the North Caucasus, especially the doctrinal basis for national minority policy adopted from the Soviet period. This ideology of ethnic ("national") statehood under conditions of liberalization, weak civil society, and economic and moral crisis gave rise to incorrect aims, unfeasible laws and decisions on the part of the authorities, useless disputes, and unjustified tensions between people. Irresponsible politicians and adventurers are taking advantage of this situation, out of either cynicism or delusion. Political ideology and state-legal directives are in urgent need of correction in favor of universal civil foundations of federal and democratic governance.

On the General Principles and Doctrine of Statehood

All Russian state-administrative entities, including the republics (states) of the North Caucasus, primarily represent territorial associations of citizens, on behalf of whom and in whose interests power at any level is created and exists. At the same time, entities within the state (units of the federation) reflect and take into account the cultural makeup of the population included within their borders. In all locations, the population has a multiethnic character. It is naпve and dangerous to suppose that statehood could be created for one ethnic group (people) in the North Caucasus. However, neither should it be thought that the state should be neutral towards the ethnic composition of the population or that it should not reflect this important factor in its structure and policies.

The Russian federal-constitutional structure including the republics is the most democratic and optimal structure for the North Caucasus. At the same time, recent experience has shown that it can be clumsily or deliberately used to infringe upon the rights of citizens or to weaken statehood as a whole. It is not the policy of advantages for some and infringements for others, but rather the policy of cultural pluralism and respect for civil rights on both the national and republic levels that must lie at the foundation of the social order if crises and conflicts are to be avoided.

It is possible that the state and traditional legal systems may coexist in the North Caucasus, with the latter serving as an auxiliary system. Legal pluralism, which exists and is developing in many countries, could be more effective in this region than a "single unified legal sphere." The main thing is that this would be an improvement of governance and not a bureaucratic redivision of duties. In certain republics, there are positive political innovations in the area of collective governance and representation of ethnic communities, although the principle of ethnic curiae or parties has serious limitations and could have the potential for conflict.

The Economy and Social Life

For Russia, the North Caucasus has very great economic significance, representing a component of the economic complex of the Russian Federation without which the country's economic security cannot be assured. The region is becoming a zone of fierce competition among world powers wishing to enhance their economic standing in the Caspian and Black Sea regions. The potential for strengthening the influence of the central government's economic policies in the region will depend on the overall socioeconomic situation in the country, which remains unfavorable in the near term, as well as on the settlement of conflicts in the region.

Only internal resources can be the main factor in the economic development of the region, as external (foreign) investments are hindered by the instability in the region. In order to mobilize these resources, the central government must promote the development in the region of small businesses offering quick return on investments. The government must also facilitate intra-regional integration and help to attract sources of financing beyond those provided by the federal budget. The mixed investment picture attests to the fact that despite the difficulties of reforming the Russian economy, and despite the deterioration of the situation following the financial-economic crisis, certain republics and administrative territories of the North Caucasus are finding sources of capital investment financing, albeit in insufficient amounts. Attracting external capital investments depends not only on stability, but also on energetic efforts to spread the word about the potential for profitable business.

There are two conflicting tendencies to be seen with regard to budget matters. On the one hand, the federal government is compelled to grant great financial independence to the regions, leaving to them a significant portion of the taxes paid to its subjects. On the other hand, the federal government still cannot completely refrain from making additional transfers out of fear of separatism within the federation and due to the high level to which many regional budgets depend on allocations from the center. Federal budget financial assistance to subjects of the North Caucasus economic region should be differentiated to an even greater degree and should be based not on the principle of "evening out" levels of budget expenditures, but on the principle of effectiveness.

The social sphere and its "sore points" should be a subject of special concern for the federal and regional authorities: the situation of the unemployed, especially young people and women, and the status of refugees, retirees, and the disabled. Support should be given to the proposal by the Ministry of Labor and Social Development of the Russian Federation on allocating federal budget funds for the payment of pensions and subsidies to veterans and the disabled. This should be done not by simple transfer payments to the local governments, but rather by means of narrowly focused special financing channels, namely through the Pension and Social Funds and their regional branches.

The main problem of the region is that of employment for the young male population, who make up a substantial part of local societies and whose behavior largely determines the current situation. The most difficult question lies in finding suitable work for residents of villages and small cities, where social marginalization is occurring. A solution may be sought in two areas: 1) in limiting the growth of mountain villages and assisting in radical improvement of the quality of life in them; and 2) in organizing private-community utilization of lands with orientation towards the private market-based sale of agricultural output. At the same time, programs for the socioeconomic development of the region should include a predominance of investments in those branches of industry or agriculture that can employ women and young people in particular.

The North Caucasus is in urgent need of profound and well-considered land reform with input from current world experience. It is possible that this will not entail placing cultivated land into private ownership, but there is no way to avoid placing pasturelands into collective-community ownership. Land reform must take into account traditions of community use and the heritage of Soviet collectivization. Land reform in the Caucasus must be carried out not only with the involvement of local and federal resources and experts, but also with international input, especially from the International Development Bank, which has experience in facilitating such programs in India, Brazil, and other countries.

The most important thing for the economy of the North Caucasus is its full integration into the national market. We must stop slighting North Caucasus entrepreneurship, but on the contrary we must support it on a Russia-wide scale. Taking into account demographic factors and resource possibilities, it should be recognized that there is a need for constant and seasonal labor migration of the population of the republics into other regions of the country, and the necessary conditions must be created for this process.

The leaders of North Caucasus regions and business circles should make use of the favorable conditions of demand for domestic agricultural produce and strengthen positive trends in the operation of food industry enterprises. If this is done, improvements in the operation of industry as a whole can be expected. On the whole, however, improvements in the industrial situation in the North Caucasus cannot be anticipated without a structural reform of the production sphere.

The shadow (informal) economy exists in the North Caucasus. On one hand, it is a result of the transitional period of reform and the imperfect nature of market relations and legal norms. On the other, it represents a continuation of local traditions of secondary employment, the income from which is concealed from official taxation. This factor must be taken into account in analyzing living standards and income levels of the region's population and in assessing the financial support base for federation subjects. Accordingly, it must also be considered in developing a plan for federal assistance to the North Caucasus. At the same time, measures should be taken to reduce the level of criminalization of the economy and of everyday life. Problems related to open borders and to the drug and weapons trades demand immediate solution.

The Political Process and Governance

The federal presence in the North Caucasus is strengthened as tensions intensify in this or that area, resembling a "putting out fires" approach to resolving conflict situations. The federal government has not managed to define forms of its representation that are adequate to the complexity of the problems in the region. The main problem lies in the lack of a clear strategy and of coordinated action on the part of various federal structures to carry it out, the insufficient amount of attention being paid to local specifics, and the reactive and delayed nature of decisions that are made.

The most important element in the policy of federalism and multiculturalism necessary for effective state governance and the promotion of stability in the North Caucasus is the maintenance and guaranteed provision of representation for the region, including for ethnic communities, at the federal government level. Implementing this policy entails a number of difficulties, which can and must be overcome. Among these difficulties are:

1. the lack of constitutional guarantees of representation of small ethnic communities in higher legislative and executive organs of power or even mechanisms for unofficial agreements or understanding of the significance of this issue;
2. the presence among some key government officials of common anti-Caucasian phobias and unspoken (or sometimes even openly expressed) manifestations of chauvinism (especially among members of the State Duma);
3. the insufficient professional competence and weak civic and disciplinary responsibility of some government officials and members of parliament representing the North Caucasus, as well as their inability to overcome ethnic and clan solidarity in the name of serving the state and the law.

One of the most difficult questions is that of the presence of a large number of contradictions between the constitutional structure of the North Caucasus republics and federal legislation. As a rule, however, they have no effect in practice on relations between the republics and the federal government. This collision attests to the need for a more flexible and contemporary approach to questions involving legal systems in states with populations with a complex cultural and religious makeup.

Given the specific characteristics of land use in the region, legislative settlement of the land question on the basis of market principles and under a system of joint federal-regional lawmaking is a key element in ensuring long-term stability in the North Caucasus. Special laws and norms on land are essential for mountain regions, taking into account cultural and economic traditions and international experience in land reform in high mountain regions (Andes, Tibet, etc.).

One of Soviet legacies was the appearance of a number of ethno-territorial units now having the status of republic-states, which can be considered a positive achievement of Soviet and current Russian policies of respecting the rights of peoples. Today, the North Caucasus republics and their borders are legitimate and sufficiently accepted. Changing statuses and borders in the region instead of improving the system of government and management could shatter the peace and relative stability in the North Caucasus.

Recent experience of internal territorial disputes associated with the Stalinist heritage of deportations shows that attempts to restore "historical justice" lead to new injustices with regard to the current population. Under the auspices of a common state, these problems must be resolved by means of mutual cooperation, freedom of movement and residence, development of economic and humanitarian ties, and respect for the individual and collective rights of citizens.

Despite all possible optimal conditions for the Dagestani political innovation regarding consociational democracy, one of the most significant elements of the republic's system of ethnic representation - the mechanism for ethnic rotation and division of power - is still not functioning. Furthermore, alternatives to such a system of power are not yet evident, as witnessed by the three-time failure of the referendum on institution of the post of president.

The reason for the failure of the division of power and ethnic rotation in areas with ethnically complex populations lies not so much in the system of consociationalism as in the insufficient civil-legal consciousness of the population and politicians and in the defining influence of criminal-corruption forces and ties, which use political mobilization along ethnic and dzamaat (clan seniority) lines for their own interests.

The relatively short and difficult experience of establishing state structures and systems of governance in the North Caucasus subjects of the federation has revealed a number of important elements capable of having a decisive impact on political stability and conflict prevention. Among them are the following:

1. the requirement for a regular transfer of power on an electoral basis with strict observance of existing constitutional principles and laws;
2. the impermissibility of the policy of electoral orientation of federal authorities versus certain political figures to the detriment of democratic principles regarding elections and the competitiveness of the process for forming organs of state power and governance;
3. the need for improving the competence and legal consciousness of politicians and the population on questions of state governance, including on means of forming cross-ethnic political coalitions (parties) aimed at facilitating the electoral process and the formation of governing institutions;
4. the need to consider the specific make-up of the population and its traditions in creating local state structures while observing fundamental principles of democratic governance as defined by the federal and local constitutions.

If the Dagestani cultural mosaic and the lack of an ethnic majority justify the experiment in ethnic parity (rotation), then the legislative establishment of representational parity for an ethnic minority of the population (for example, in Adygea) is a violation of fundamental norms of democratic governance and of the foundations of the federal constitution. This concession to ethnonationalism was possible due to the weak organization of civil society and the inertia of the former policy of preferences for so-called "titular nationalities." In a number of republics, this conflict-engendering element of the political structure can and should be eliminated by the public self-organization, through peaceful democratic procedures, and with the support of the federal authorities.

The problem of internal separatism in republics where citizens of various nationalities have long lived mixed together must be resolved by means of improving the system of governance, enhancing the process by which officials can be removed from power, and ensuring wider representation of various groups in the organs of power, and not by further dividing state jurisdictions under conditions where it is impossible to set administrative boundaries congruent of ethnic areas.

Urgent efforts are needed to neutralize positions of radical ethnic entrepreneurs and to prevent the mobilization of the population around non-negotiable political projects. Nevertheless, prospects for "cantonization," that is, the formation of smaller ethnic self-governing entities within the boundaries of existing republics, should not be excluded from the agenda. However, this should only be done by means of the system for constitutional referenda, and it should be done gradually so as not to make irreparable errors.

In the post-Soviet period, the relative stability of political regimes and ruling elite clans, which has played a stabilizing role in general, has not promoted the popular representation, normal power transfers, and co-existence of elite groups. This makes the succession of power problematic and fraught with conflict. Other continuing problems include the professional instruction of the elites in principles and foundations of governance by state training, as well as the inculcation in them of feelings of all-Russian commonality and state-wide governmental responsibility.

The North Caucasus is a territory with special local customs and traditions differing from those in other parts of Russia. Federal and republic authorities should weigh the extent to which similar institutions and norms correspond to the goals of peace and stability. The process of "national renewal" is accompanied by the revival of teip, dzamaat, gorge, family, and other patriarchic ties. Predominating in such ties are representatives of corrupt governmental, military, or banking-commercial structures, who form clans that control power and resources. The authoritarianism and ethnically closed nature of clan structures is one of the reasons behind the violation of the rights of representatives of the "non-titular" population. Even in North Ossetia, which has seen the smallest outflow of the non-titulars, representatives of these groups are in fact pushed out of organs of power. In other republics, the situation is even more unfavorable.

In forming organs of power, it would be useful to try out certain electoral mechanisms that have almost never been tried in practice in Russia's regions but which are so well known in the world, namely the system of casting of a second vote. (By this system, in electing a single head of the republic, as such a system of power has already been chosen, small ethnic and social segments receive an additional means for having their interests taken into account). Another mechanism is the proportional system for parliamentary elections, which provides a more accurate reflection of the structure of a society with a complex make-up.

Political life in the North Caucasus is stuck at the federal unit level, with insufficient development of the super- and sub-regional levels. Practically all power is concentrated at the republic, the oblast, or the krai levels. Funds from the federal government flow through and are redistributed by them. The vertical stratification of power must be targeted, with power to be redistributed between the level of the region as a whole - of individual federal units - to the subregional level (local administration, community self-government).

Another possible idea is the creation of a North Caucasus parliamentary assembly, which would make it possible to resolve some local problems at a higher level than is currently permitted by the frameworks of separate federation units. Assistance should be given to the regional association "North Caucasus" as an institute that could help in resolving socioeconomic problems of region-wide significance. At the same time, the creation of a regional association of municipal formations should be facilitated. The experience of the activity of the Association of Cities of South Russia could be applied in the establishment of the new regional association. This association will serve as a counterbalance to the influence of the federal units' authorities and as an additional tool for the resolution of problems of the region.

Assistance should be given to ethnic-cultural societies, especially societies of peoples "divided up" among several federation units. In this way, ethnic minorities will be able to achieve self-realization in broader territorial scopes.

In raising the efficiency of the federal/regional rule in the North Caucasus, there should be adherence to the principal of multi-territoriality - having various districts with different boundaries for the purposes of taxation, environmental protection, transportation, etc., with their administrative centers located in various centers in the North Caucasus. Provisions must be made for the possibility of forming special regions based on the example of the existing specially protected Caucasian Mineral Waters ecological-resort region created by presidential decree in 1993 and jointly ruled by regional and federal authorities. The borders of such special regions may not coincide with the borders of federation units.

The goal of such measures is to overcome the isolation that characterizes political and socioeconomic life in certain federal units, to avoid the concentration of all power and total subjugation on this level, to create multiple centers of political life, and to build complex systems of checks and balances. Federal budget funds must be broadly dispersed on various levels. For ethnic minorities, this in particular will mean the appearance of new mechanisms for resolving their problems and additional possibilities for self-realization in newly formed governance structures.

Politics under Conditions of Conflict

Russian federal policy in conflicts and crisis situations must be predictable. To achieve this, it is essential that the executive powers be clearly delineated and that multiple centers of decision-making at the federal level be eliminated. Scurrying from side to side and supporting first one then another of the opposing sides in conflicts has proven to be a mistaken approach. It is unacceptable to have official contacts with people who have openly challenged the state, particularly when such people are wanted criminals. Also intolerable are situations when negotiations are held today but tomorrow the negotiators are arrested, or vice versa.

It is necessary to create a system for defining the powers of various federal organs involved in policy in the North Caucasus and those of executive authorities of regional subjects. Without this definition, it is impossible to eliminate the duplication of functions of this or that government agency, liquidate the layer of questions previously left "unassigned," and institute strict control over the execution of decisions that have been made.

Measures taken by federal and local organs in conflicts and crisis situations in the region must be adequate to the current situation. The use of force must be measured, and the security of the civil population must be the natural limitation of its use. Slowness in the use of force options when required by the situation is likewise impermissible. Conflicts cannot be resolved exclusively by military means. The use of force, if necessary, is a preceding stage or a requisite component of the process of political resolution of a conflict.

State policy in conflicts should be transparent within reasonable limits. Rumors and conjectures lead to catastrophic consequences in crisis situations. At the same time, under current conditions it is essential to have professional services performing public information and press relations functions with regard to the actions of the state in conflict situation, especially in conditions where mass-scale military actions or special operations are being conducted.

Procedures for settling and preventing conflicts must be founded on an appropriate legal base. The legislative regulation of a state-of-emergency regime, the status of border territories, the legal bases for relations with the Republic of Chechnya, the rights of ethnic minorities - these are only a small number of the federal laws that must be passed by the State Duma.

Armed Separatism and Terrorism

Resources for the internal development of Chechnya are exhausted due to current prospects for armed separatism. The situation in the republic has reached an impasse. The opposing forces in Chechnya are incapable of resolving the systemic crisis. The government of Chechnya has allowed the activities of international terrorism on its territory. As an alternative to armed separatism, one might propose the modernized segment of Chechen society both in Chechnya itself and outside its borders. The task of the Chechen elite lies in uniting these forces ideologically and organizationally and consolidating the Chechen people on the basis of a policy of common sense.

The efforts to enforce an Islamic (Sharia-based) state is aimed at destroying basically secular culture of the Chechen people and their traditional (adat) customs and it challenges the Russian-oriented local power and religious elites. The pseudo-independent Chechnya has been transformed into a base for the militant Islamists, and until the country's authorities take a consistent line on neutralizing armed groups, the situation will only get worse.

On the basis of new forces and agreements, cooperation is possible between federal and Chechen structures in fighting crime, undertaking reconstruction efforts, paying pensions and other benefits, providing targeted humanitarian assistance to the population, and implementing educational and healthcare (rehabilitation) programs. The strategy for resolving the conflict is based on an exchange of help from all of Russia in rebuilding the economy and the social sphere of self-governing Chechen Republic in return for recognition of the common state.

The process of normalizing relations with the federal authorities is in the vital interests of the Chechen people and receives their support. Despite the fact that this option is in the strategic interests of the population of Chechnya and Russia at large, carrying it out will not be easy. Both sides (especially the federal authorities) must display patience, the ability to compromise, and the willingness to act in the interest of the majority of citizens of the Chechen Republic.

Internationalization of the conflict and the introduction of international peacekeeping forces into Chechnya are impermissible. If this occurs, the course of events will be accompanied by a move, hoped for by influential external forces, towards the full independence of Chechnya, which radically contradicts the interests of Russia. Along some positive contribution representatives of the OSCE have already indirectly pursued such an option in 1995-1996.

The federal authorities are obligated to pursue to the end the struggle against uncontrolled armed groups while avoiding massive casualties or destruction. Actions must be taken to ensure that the Chechen people are represented in legislative organs of federal power. Assistance might be given to representatives of the Chechen people, the majority of whom live outside the borders of the republic, to help them organize themselves to participate in and influence the process of political settlement of the conflict.

The Religious Factor in Conflicts

The influence of Dagestani and Chechen Wahhabis is limited, and it is not a wide-spread phenomenon. The majority of Dagestani Wahhabis do not support the idea of the Chechen Islamic radicals on creating a unified Chechen-Dagestani Islamic state. Religeous extremism can be defeated only by relying on the forces of humanist Islam. At the same time, the peacemaking potential of religion is limited. When open armed conflicts are occurring, religion is not capable of serving as the basic form for peacemaking efforts. However, the religious factor should not be ignored in forming policy in the region. It is important to maintain a systematic dialogue between representatives of the leading faiths - Islam and Orthodoxy.

Manifestations of the idea of "Islamic solidarity" are limited, inasmuch as Islam in the North Caucasus is divided along ethnic lines. At the doctrinal level, "dogmatic Islam" has little in common with the syncretic, Suffi Islam of the brotherhoods. It is unlikely that quasi-governmental associations will arise on the foundation of Islam. A hypothetical imamat on the basis of Dagestan and Chechnya would hardly be likely at any time, as confirmed in the course of the conflict on the border between Chechnya and Dagestan.

Islam has demonstrated its limitations as a political means of achieving interethnic accord. As a factor in interethnic and religious mobilization at the regional level, it can manifest itself only in cases of repressive actions on the part of the federal and republic authorities. On the whole, the religious factor cannot be the main means of achieving political stability in the region.

At the same time, religion, especially Islam, is gaining increasing significance in public life. However, absolute pronouncements should not be made on the significance of the religious factor, and it should not be used as an argument on the so-called "clashes between civilizations." The peaceful coexistence of various faiths should be highlighted, along with the search for dialogue between their adherents, including in the sphere of political relations.

The Cultural Space and the Russian Factor

As a result of its entry into the Russian state and its participation in Russian cultural dialogue, including Russian language and culture, the North Caucasus has acquired the commonalties that enable one to speak of it as a historical-cultural and not just an economic-geographic region.

The foundations of democratic governance, interests of maintaining the cultural diversity of Russia, and international legal standards demand respect for the small cultures and provision for the rights of citizens arising from their belonging to certain ethnic community. Cultural strategy in the region must be based on ensuring and harmoniously facilitating all three cultural streams (North Caucasian, all-Russian, and world), to which one might add an important cross-section of local cultural interactions.

Reform of the alphabet and orthography is considered by some Caucasian linguists to be an urgent task, and it may take on important cultural-educational and socio-political significance. It requires comprehensive analysis so that a decision may be made without causing harm to the citizens of a larger state where the Russian language and Cyrillic alphabet predominate. It should be noted that substantial part of the North Caucasus population speak Russian as their native language, and the Russian language serves an important role interethnic communication. A hasty decision on the question could lead to conflict situations and create distance between citizens of a given republic or country.

One general aim of cultural-language policy should be the universal development of local-Russian bilingualism (or multilingualism) as the sole formula for ensuring further modernization and the integration of North Caucasians into the national culture, which is based on the Russian language, as well as the preservation of local languages as an important element of ethnic identity and cultural distinctiveness.

Real life, individual strategies and current theory prove that widespread bilingualism and multilingualism are not only possible but also represent an additional advantage for those citizens who speak several languages while living in a multiethnic state or region. It would be advantageous if this principle were to spread to the Russian-speaking population as well by using all possible means to stimulate them to master local languages, which should promote a healthier climate with regard to inter-ethnic relations in the region.

Counteractions and educational efforts are needed with regard to radical-nationalistic appeals to place Russian and other languages in opposition to each other or to diminish the status of the Russian language. These appeals are aimed at achieving the self-isolation and cultural demodernization of the population of the North Caucasus. The Russian language is in equal measure the cultural property of all residents of the region. The acclimation of part of the population to the Russian language does not necessarily mean the disappearance of one's identity and is not someone's fault. By knowing the Russian language, people gain better opportunities for life carrier, integration into the broader outside world, and a stronger civic identity and all-Russian loyalty.

With regard to local languages, the course must be set towards a better study of the real situation concerning their functional status and their potentials for preservation and further development. The necessary level of maintenance for all small languages must be ensured without forcing their use in the socio-political and economic spheres, which function in a regime of broader inter-ethnic contacts and do not allow for group isolation.

The languages of the peoples of the North Caucasus can be preserved and can successfully realize their important ethno-cultural functions even if they are used and are supported predominantly in the spheres of the family, culture, and the humanities. The successful functional differentiation of language spheres is illustrated by the experience of many states with multi-ethnic populations. The development of ethnic languages (especially those of small ethnic groups) requires state support primarily in the areas of modernization-oriented language reforms, preparation of textbooks and other literature, and the production of programs in the mass media.

In implementing foundations for primary education in the native language and expanding and intensifying possibilities for the study of native languages and literature in the higher grades, schools in the North Caucasus are in need of profound scientific analysis of the problems associated with these processes. These processes give rise to important tasks that must be accomplished by the pedagogical and ethnographic sciences. Efforts must be devoted to uncovering the sociolinguistic features of the living languages of the North Caucasus, analyzing the existing system for native language education, defining the optimal relation between the native and Russian languages in the instruction process, and improving programs and methodologies for teaching both native languages and other subjects in the native languages.

In view of the new demands of social transformations, especially those associated with the development of a market economy and democratic institutions, the educational sphere faces the task of mass training of professional financial and management personnel, legal specialists, social workers, specialists in the tourism and recreation business, etc. Placing excessive emphasis on studies in the humanities creates an overproduction of specialists in professions of little use (mainly among members of the "titular nationality"). Not enough specialists are produced in those spheres of social employment that could facilitate effective economic transformations and stable political governance and, most importantly, could resolve the problem of suitable employment for the younger generation. In this regard, educational priorities are directly linked with the prevention of social tension and establishment of peace in the region.

Among the most important issues associated with providing for the cultural and information needs of the region's population, the urgent need for development of local-language radio and television broadcasting should be noted.

The current difficulties in the North Caucasus are exacerbated by the fact that historically speaking, Russia, or more precisely Russian-language-based culture, is losing its unlimited domination in this region, which essentially means the end of simple "russification" and "europeanization." Both local ethnic cultures and world cultural systems tied to the Islamic or "Eastern" traditions are gaining significance in the cultural space. Depending on carefully designed cultural policy, this process may be turned to the good and not to the bad.

On the whole, the North Caucasus remains in the European cultural domain, as, by the way, do practically all the states of the former USSR. Even under conditions of the militant pro-Islamist regime in Chechnya, it would be difficult if not impossible to term as successful the attempts to dismantle the Russian and European elements from the cultural image of the North Caucasian peoples. Neither could such attempts be called expedient from the standpoint of the interests of the peoples themselves.

Despite the widespread language assimilation, which has essentially made the region bilingual, there has been no deeper permeation of ethnic Russian cultural standards into local life, although the level of cultural adoptions and mutual influences continues to be high and will remain so in the future. It is the presence of Russian culture in the region that largely determines the common cultural characteristics of the area, and not some "unique North Caucasus civilization."

Given the losses and transformations that the cultures of the peoples of the Caucasus have suffered, many of the foundations of native ways of life and outlooks have been preserved, and they continue to have a strong influence on the ethnocultural profile of the peoples. Some all-Russian standards have been unacceptable for the local ethnocultural practices, although outside the scope of everyday life (in the socio-political structure, the legal system, professional culture, science, and the media) all-Russian cultural values are rather powerfully evident. This complex co-existence and unique cultural dialogue must be maintained as the most optimal for this region of Russia.

In the current situation, the specific characteristics of post-Soviet transformations in the North Caucasus are promoting the growth of "revivalist" sentiments, feeding the rise of traditional ethnic values, and spurring the growth of alienation with regard to "cosmopolitan" cultural standards that are now circulated censorship-free by the Russian (and primarily Muscovite) media, bringing hard-to-accept norms and values (sex, violence, etc.) to their readers, listeners, and viewers in print, radio, and television form.

The significant influx of forced migrants, including those of the titular nationalities, into the North Caucasus can serve to trigger extraordinary events both with respect to the further exacerbation of the socio-economic situation in the region and even more importantly with respect to the exacerbation of not only interethnic, but also intra-ethnic relations. This has the unavoidable consequence of intensifying the already significant outflow of the ethnic Russian population. Public organizations in the North Caucasus, including chauvinistic Cossaks organizations, are not in a position to resolve the serious problems facing the region's Russian population.

The economic malfunctioning and the ethnic particularism do not allow the leaders of the North Caucasus republics and local ethnic movements to see the long-term negative consequences of the forced migration of ethnic Russians and of other non-titulars. Without a comprehensive program aimed at reducing interethnic tensions and thus stabilizing the ethnopolitical situation in the region, it will be impossible to define an effective migration policy capable of if not halting then at least reducing this out-migration from the republics of the North Caucasus and thus eliminating its negative consequences.

Science, Conflict Mythology, and Peacemaking

A register needs to be compiled listing the problems of current societal development in the North Caucasus. This task could be undertaken through the joint efforts of social scientists and politicians. Conferences of Caucasus specialists in and outside the region could serve as forums for such discussions, especially if they include policy-makers and other practioners of various levels. Analysis is needed of the status of expertise itself, of the level and results of completed and planned research, and of the status of research personnel and their specializations.

Measures should be taken to bring the forces of the scholarly community to bear to counteract the spread of antiscientific views and historical and political speculations, the manipulation of mass consciousness, and the sowing of interethnic discord and nationalistic mythology.

In maintaining academic freedom, it is essential to increase the level of professional and civic responsibility of social scientists studying the problems of the Caucasus and to affirm among them not only narrow ethnic, but all-Russian loyalties and orientations. In particular, this can be done by wider introduction of research contracts and grants from state sources for the support of scholarships.

A more active and critical dialogue should be initiated with foreign specialists on the Caucasus, defending the priorities of domestic expert analysis and influencing more sensitive approaches among the international academic community. Radical improvements should be made in the status of scholarly criticism related to the field of Caucasus studies, including such works featuring politicized engagements on the part of domestic and foreign experts. Good domestic research works should be published in larger quantities, including versions to be translated and published in foreign languages.

In order to counter nationalist historical mythology, it is necessary to do the following:

1. officially recognize past injustices made with regard to small peoples and ethnic groups (including the covering over of historical facts and events important to them);
2. cultivate multiculturalism, which requires unconditional respect for other ethnic traditions;
3. strengthen control over the creation of textbooks and other educational literature and establish committees of scientists authorized to reject publications containing xenophobic or racist statements;
4. organize conferences of historians and anthropologists (including archaeologists and linguists) to discuss and reach mutually acceptable agreement on controversial issues of history and cultural legacies.

The character of diasporas is determined by historical and contemporary realities, and their actions can be spurred by the influence of external and internal ethno-political factors. On the whole, diasporas and their ethnic-cultural organizations are becoming active participants in political processes in the area and throughout the North Caucasus region. In this regard, the following recommendations might be proposed:

1. In developing and implementing programs for creating harmonious interethnic relations, attention must be paid to the diaspora factor and to the growing role of international ethnic/cultural associations.
2. In taking account of ethnic affinities, the interests of the various groups must be differentiated, singling out the religious, cultural, and linguistic aspects, and particularly the degree to which ethnocultural orientations are respected and preserved.
3. In organizing the peacemaking process, ethnic-cultural organizations should be actively included, making use of their pacifying potentials.
4. Ethnic-cultural societies should participate more actively in the educational process, thus promoting the harmonization of interethnic relations. They should take part in conferences, meetings, symposia, people's diplomacy activities, celebrations of appropriate holidays, cultural days, festivals, and appearances in the media.
5. The activities of appropriate municipal services, interethnic councils and committees at various levels, and interethnic friendship centers should be encouraged.
6. State agencies and municipal services should facilitate implementation of the principle of ethnic-cultural autonomy. Ties should be strengthened between ethnic-cultural societies and municipalities and state administrations at the regional and territorial levels.
7. Research and educational literature should be published to provide for the needs of educational programs with an ethnic component. Publications should be produced for representatives of diasporas, as well as ethnic newspapers and magazines.
8. The leadership and members of ethnic-cultural societies should be invited to attend seminars and courses designed to improve their qualifications on ethnic themes, and provisions should be made for the overall ethnological education of the population.

The emerging practice of peacemaking in the region gives rise to the conclusion that the present situation in the North Caucasus dictates a need for practical implementation of a multilevel system of interaction including federal and regional authorities, local self-government, public and scientific organizations, the media, and creative associations in the North Caucasus, as well as international organizations.

Foreign Policy Aspects and Activities

The geopolitical aspect of international relations, or more accurately the struggle of states for power and influence, is only one side of the complex interplay of interests among the numerous actors who have become involved in the processes occurring in the North Caucasus. These processes largely have internal roots.

Russia's weakness creates opportunities for intensifying foreign influence in the North Caucasus, but in reality the "vacuum of power" attracts to the region destructive forces outside of responsible international control. Islamic extremism in its armed terrorist form has begun its destructive penetration into this region as well. It is this concern and experience in countering Islamic extremism that Russia could use more actively in its relations with the United States and the countries of the European Community.

Russian foreign policy agencies and other state, public, and business organizations and forces must focus their attention on strengthening economic and humanitarian ties with Turkey, with the active participation of state and business circles in the North Caucasus. One argument not yet made in advancing Russia's position concerns the enormous benefits that Turkey has received in recent years from the activities of its construction firms and other companies in the Russian Federation and from economic and recreational tourism on the part of Russian travelers in Turkey.

The theocratic nature of the Saudi state, the makeup and views of its ruling elite, and its financial capacity make the Saudi Arabia one of the leading international actors in the North Caucasus. Special methods and approaches must be worked out to neutralize this influence.

The actions of a number of external forces in the North Caucasus (for example, oil companies and non-governmental organizations) are poorly controlled by states or are not controlled by them at all. Such phenomena as terrorism, the drug trade, and organized crime are becoming increasingly international in nature. Therefore, it is essential to take into account the growing significance of the globalization of political, economic, and communications relations in the world and its various regions, including in the North Caucasus.

There is no overall strategy uniting the diverse array of external forces, but the sense of their activity lies in turning the Russia's North Caucasus into part of the Muslim world and in including it in a geopolitical sense in an "bigger Near and Middle East." Attempts to achieve this goal represent in both the short and long terms a most serious threat to the national interests of Russia and to stability and peace in the North Caucasus.

Russia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia must reach agreements and cooperate with regard to regions of armed separatism in their countries in the aim of ensuring territorial integrity, settling armed conflicts, and protecting themselves against international terrorism. In its relations with these neighboring and culturally similar countries, Russia must use the economic argument that up to now, one of the main sources of income for the populations of Azerbaijan and Georgia is not international oil projects, but rather trading and entrepreneurial activity on the part of Azerbaijanis and Georgians on Russian territory. The Russian market, and not Caspian oil, will remain as the main source of life subsistence for the population of these countries in the future as well.

The spread of traditional Islam in the North Caucasus can promote the stabilization of the situation in the region. The problem with this religious activity is two-fold. First, it is to a substantial extent carried out by foreign Islamic centers, given the lack of support by the Russian authorities for the established Islamic institutions and the widespread Islamophobia in society. Second, the activity is partly directed by foreign circles pursuing not so much religious as geopolitical aims.

Russian foreign policy and diplomacy face the task of creating favorable external conditions for achieving the primary goals of preserving the integrity of the state and strengthening its unity while developing a law-based democratic state that gives priority to human rights. In order to carry out this task, a coordinated strategy must be developed and implemented, with the main points being as follows:

1. increasing the interest of foreign capital in stabilizing the situation in the North Caucasus and increasing its participation in development projects in the region;
2. placing a high priority on normalizing and developing relations in all basic spheres with the bordering Caucasus states;
3. institutionalizing political dialogue with Turkey in the aim of achieving strategic mutual understanding with Russia; instituting consultations at the level of the General Staffs of the Armed Forces of Russia and Turkey; intensifying political contacts with Israel, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan;
4. taking measures aimed at historical reconciliation between Russia and the Islamic world in the aim of turning traditional Islam in the North Caucasus into an ally in the struggle against extremism;
5. isolating extremist forces in the North Caucasus by means of an interested dialogue with the leadership of Turkey, Egypt, Israel, other states of the Near and Middle East, the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the European Union, and the United States; strengthening collaboration with the appropriate services of these states in the common struggle against international terrorism;
6. taking forestalling actions with regard to the previous agreement on determination of the status of Chechnya by 2001 in the aim of preventing a situation in which the lack of resolution on this issue might serve as a pretext for a foreign state to recognize Chechnya's independence;
7. explaining to the Russian public and the outside world the goals and methods of Russian policy in the North Caucasus in the aim of gaining understanding and support;
8. equipping the state border with Azerbaijan and Georgia, creating a special security zone on the territory of Chechnya and surrounding areas, and establishing a regional system for ensuring the security of southern Russia.

The states of the European Union are real partners of Russia in the Caucasus, interested in stabilizing the peripheral regions of Europe and oriented towards cooperation with the Russian Federation. In order to set the stage for cooperation with the European Union, Russia must in its actions in the North Caucasus follow the norms and principles of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Civilian control over the actions of military structures is of particular significance. At the same time, Russia must energetically oppose the attempts of the European Parliament and other international structures to use the situation in Chechnya and Dagestan for narrowly political interests. The actions of a number of European structures as well as the governmental circles of certain states do not facilitate conflict resolution and actually provoke new conflicts in the region.

Transnational corporations could also become partners of Russia in carrying out projects necessary for stability in the Caucasus-Caspian region. Russia could act jointly or in parallel with states of the Caucasus and the Near and Middle East. It is especially significant that mutual understanding be reached between Russia and the United States on a set of questions associated with the development of the situation in the Caucasus-Caspian region and Central Asia.

Guaranteeing Russia's foreign policy interests regarding the North Caucasus requires the coordination of the efforts of the federal government, the North Caucasus republics, and those federation units with broad international ties (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Moscow, St. Petersburg, etc.). It would be useful to create a consultative organ composed of the heads of the executive and legislative powers of the appropriate regions and the leaders of a number of federal departments and agencies.